\u3ci\u3eApprendi\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Two Constitutional Rights by Stith, Kate
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW 
Volume 99 Number 5 Article 5 
6-1-2021 
Apprendi's Two Constitutional Rights 
Kate Stith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kate Stith, Apprendi's Two Constitutional Rights, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2021). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol99/iss5/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2021) 
APPRENDI’S TWO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS* 
KATE STITH** 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies “in all criminal prosecutions.” 
But when does a “criminal prosecution” end? In United States v. Haymond, 
the latest in the line of Apprendi v. New Jersey cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
fractured on the question of whether postsentence revocations of supervised 
release fall within the Sixth Amendment right’s scope. With Haymond as its 
vantage point, this Article suggests that the Court’s post-Apprendi 
jurisprudence has intertwined the Sixth Amendment jury right with Fifth 
Amendment due process and that the constitutional law of sentencing would be 
well served by disentangling these two fundamental protections and refocusing 
on due process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Jury Trial Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment require that “any fact,” other than a prior conviction, “that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”2 While I 
have always admired Justice Stevens’s majority opinion,3 I have found it curious 
that subsequent cases treated the jury and reasonable doubt requirements as 
 
 *  © 2021 Kate Stith. 
 **  Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law. I thank Carissa Byrne Hessick and the other 
participants in the Symposium on “Apprendi at 20,” as well as the editors of the North Carolina Law 
Review. Once again, Max Jesse Goldberg, Yale Law School Class of 2022, has provided wonderful 
research assistance and editorial suggestions—and he is a pleasure to work with. 
 1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 490. 
 3. See generally Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under the Constitution, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 
240–51 (2005) (focusing on Justice Stevens’s position in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; and several important earlier cases including United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 
148 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 
(1986)). 
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though they were a single right, joined at the hip. As recounted in detail 
elsewhere in this symposium issue,4 the most significant of these subsequent 
decisions invalidated state mandatory sentencing guidelines5 and rendered the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory only.6 Eventually, and finally, the 
Court extended Apprendi’s logic to any fact that increases either the maximum 
or the minimum punishment for a crime.7 
While Apprendi and its progeny have, on balance, made sentencing fairer, 
the doctrine’s conflation of a defendant’s two underlying adjudicatory rights 
generates conceptual issues for proceedings that cannot reasonably be 
considered part of the “criminal prosecution”8 for Sixth Amendment purposes. 
Might due process nonetheless require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of facts 
that result in significant additional imprisonment? Focusing on the most recent 
case in the Apprendi line, United States v. Haymond,9 this Article discusses some 
of the problems with Apprendi’s fusion of these rights. I suggest that decoupling 
them will clarify the roles of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in 
postconviction criminal procedure. 
I.  WHEN DOES THE “CRIMINAL PROSECUTION” END? 
The Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”10 
The text tells us nothing about when the “criminal prosecution” ends. Does it 
end when a court accepts a jury’s verdict or a defendant’s plea of guilty? Perhaps 
not. Maybe the criminal prosecution continues until a court pronounces a 
sentence and enters a judgment? Or even longer? Might the “criminal 
prosecution” continue even after the sentencing and judgment? 
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with these questions in a little-noticed 
case decided in the final days of October Term 2018.11 In Haymond, the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Sixth Amendment Sentencing Right and Its Remedy, 99 N.C. 
L. REV. 1195, 1201–08 (2021). 
 5. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313–14. 
 6. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
 7. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013), overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545 (2002), abrogating McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 
545 (2002), had been the Court’s only significant retreat from Apprendi. See Stith, supra note 3, at 251–
52. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 9. 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 11. The U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions on politically charged census and gerrymandering 
cases—two more consequential criminal justice issues—and an important takings case all within a week 
of the Haymond decision. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019) (deciding 
whether a question about citizenship on the 2020 census was constitutional); Rucho v. Common Cause, 
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019) (deciding whether claims of excessive partisanship constitute 
unconstitutional gerrymandering); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323–24 (2019) (deciding 
whether a statute concerning long prison sentences was too vague); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 
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defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography, a crime carrying a 
maximum sentence of ten years in prison.12 Pursuant to a provision of the 
PROTECT Act,13 as amended by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006 (“Walsh Act”),14 he also faced an enhanced term of supervised 
release between five years and life.15 Haymond, a first-time offender, was 
sentenced to thirty-eight months’ imprisonment and ten years of supervised 
release.16 
While Haymond was under supervision, a search of his digital devices 
turned up images of child pornography.17 A hearing followed on the probation 
officer’s allegation of five supervision violations, including possession of fifty-
nine images of child pornography.18 Using the federally required evidentiary 
standard,19 the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond 
knowingly possessed thirteen images and revoked his supervised release.20 Had 
the usual statute governing supervised release revocations applied,21 the judge 
said that he “probably would have sentenced in the range of two years or less.”22 
But, under a further provision of the Walsh Act, the judge, having revoked 
supervised release, was required to sentence Haymond to an additional prison 
 
2228, 2235 (2019) (finding a violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), in the peremptory 
strike of a Black juror at the defendant’s sixth trial); Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 
(2019) (overruling the state‘s litigation requirement in takings jurisprudence). Surrounded by these 
attention grabbers, Haymond is easy to brush aside because its immediate impact is insignificant. From 
the date that the provision at issue in Haymond became law in 2006, up to the date that the provision 
was struck down in 2019—one month shy of thirteen years—Westlaw reflects that federal courts cited 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) a total of 264 times, an average of only twenty times per year. See Westlaw Search 
Results, https://1.next.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/QA2Q-WM8Z] (search “18 U.S.C. 3583(k)”; 
narrow to federal cases and orders; narrow date range to July 27, 2006, through June 26, 2019). In the 
same period, federal courts cited 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the general supervised release statute, 4,527 
times—a whopping seventeen times as often. Id. (search “18 U.S.C. 3583(e)”; narrow to federal cases 
and orders; narrow date range to July 27, 2006, and June 26, 2019). 
 12. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2373. 
 13. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C. and 34 U.S.C.); see id. § 101, 117 Stat. at 651–52 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)). 
 14. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C. and 34 U.S.C.); see id. § 141(e)(2), 120 Stat. at 603 (codified as amended at 18 US.C. 
§ 3583(k)). 
 15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). 
 16. United States v. Haymond (Haymond II), 869 F.3d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 
S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 17. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2374. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (requiring that to revoke probation, the court must find 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release”). 
 20. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 21. See § 3583(b), (e)(3). This provision was in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) from its inception in 1984. 
 22. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2375. 
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term of between five years and life.23 While the sentencing judge found this 
provision “repugnant,” he still sentenced Haymond, as required by law, to the 
mandatory minimum of five additional years in prison.24 
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the mandatory term unconstitutional 
under Alleyne v. United States,25 in which the Court had applied Apprendi’s 
requirements to increases in the minimum lawful sentencing range.26 
On June 26, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.27 However, 
Haymond, like virtually all the decisions in the Apprendi line, fractured the 
Court: three Justices joined Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion,28 another three 
Justices joined Justice Alito’s dissent,29 and Justice Breyer concurred only in the 
result.30 These three opinions warrant careful attention since they raise 
important questions about why Apprendi treated two discrete constitutional 
requirements—proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to trial by jury—
as one. 
According to Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the plurality, which included 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Apprendi and Alleyne together teach 
that a defendant has a right to have a jury determine whether the government 
has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to any fact that 
increases the floor or ceiling of the lawful sentencing range.31 Haymond was 
sentenced to five additional years of imprisonment on the basis of factfinding 
by a judge, not a jury, even though both the sentencing judge32 and the Tenth 
Circuit33 found that the government had barely met the preponderance standard 
of proof as to the issue of whether Haymond had knowingly possessed child 
pornography. 
Inconveniently for Justice Gorsuch, the additional five-year sentence was 
imposed in a revocation proceeding that took place years after Haymond’s 
original sentencing.34 Justice Gorsuch reasoned that Haymond’s sentence was 
not yet “final” under Apprendi and Alleyne—and thus the Sixth Amendment 
 
 23. This is the first sentence of the statute cited above, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (requiring a sentence 
of “not less than 5 [years], or life,” for any of the enumerated offenses involving a minor victim). 
 24. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 25. 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 26. Haymond II, 869 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 27. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 (citing Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 117–18). 
 28. See id. at 2373–85 (plurality opinion). 
 29. See id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 30. See id. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 31. Id. at 2381 (plurality opinion). 
 32. United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201, 2016 WL 4094886, at *13 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 
2016) (“The United States . . . failed to prove Haymond knowingly possessed any of the 59 images 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If this were a criminal trial and the Court were the jury, the United States 
would have lost.”), aff’d in part, 869 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). 
 33. Haymond II, 869 F.3d 1153, 1157–60 (2017). 
 34. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2373, 2375 (plurality opinion). 
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right to a jury applied—until the judge imposed the additional sentence.35 The 
plurality brushed past the Court’s well-established holdings that other aspects 
of the Sixth Amendment, such as an unqualified right to counsel, do not apply 
to probation or parole revocation proceedings.36 
It is not clear whether Justice Gorsuch paused to consider the profound 
implications of his argument for the full panoply of Sixth Amendment rights—
right to a jury trial, right to counsel, right to confrontation, and others. Focusing 
solely on Apprendi’s double-constitutional rights, the plurality asserted that the 
government could not trump these rights by simply delaying the proof of 
certain sentence-enhancing facts far beyond the completion of a defendant’s 
original sentencing proceeding, even if those facts had not yet occurred at the 
time of that proceeding.37 
II.  “POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES” 
Answering the question posed above—when does a “criminal prosecution” 
end—Justice Gorsuch wrote that “criminal prosecution continues . . . until a 
final sentence is imposed,”38 which “includes any supervised release sentence [a 
defendant] may receive.”39 And he pronounced the foundational principle that 
he thought Apprendi stands for: “[A]ny accusation triggering a new and 
additional punishment [must be] proven to the satisfaction of a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”40 
If these broad dicta were to be accepted by a majority of the Court—that 
is, if the entire Apprendi line of cases were transplanted to postsentencing 
proceedings—our present understandings of probation, parole, suspended 
sentences, and supervised release would be thrown to the wind. Indeed, Justice 
Gorsuch appeared to throw down this very gauntlet in his portentous opening 
line: “Only a jury, acting on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may take a 
person’s liberty.”41 As Justice Alito’s powerful dissent—joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh—pointed out, “taking a 
person’s liberty” is exactly what any revocation of probation, parole, or 
 
 35. Id. at 2379–80. 
 36. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (“Probation revocation . . . is not a stage of 
a criminal prosecution.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (“[R]evocation of parole is 
not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a 
proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”). 
 37. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2379 (plurality opinion) (“[We] reject[] efforts to dodge the demands 
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by the simple expedient of . . . [c]alling part of a criminal 
prosecution a ‘sentence modification’ imposed at a ‘postjudgment sentence-administration 
proceeding’ . . . .”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2380. 
 41. Id. at 2373. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2021) 
1304 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99-5 
supervised release does.42 Justice Gorsuch’s approach is radical; if followed to 
its logical conclusion, there would be a right to a jury in every probation or 
parole revocation proceeding.43 
Because of what Justice Breyer politely called the “potentially destabilizing 
consequences”44 of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, he declined to join it and 
expressed agreement with “much of the dissent.”45 Although Justice Breyer 
provided the fifth vote in Haymond’s favor, he did so on the narrowest of 
grounds.46 
Justice Breyer noted that the Court had always proceeded on the 
understanding that sanctions following supervision revocation are “not ‘for the 
particular conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were being 
sentenced as new federal criminal conduct’” but, rather, are an additional 
sentence for the underlying crime of conviction.47 That is exactly right, as all 
nine Justices seemed to agree.48 
But the Walsh Act provision is different, Justice Breyer said.49 The 
requirement of a new prison sentence of at least five years more “closely 
resemble[s] the punishment of [a] new criminal offense[].”50 And under the 
Constitution, the government may not prosecute a new criminal offense 
without providing for a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.51 
Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded, Haymond’s mandatory new five-year 
sentence was unconstitutional.52 
 
 42. Id. at 2387 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (providing for pretrial detention 
of defendants in certain circumstances). 
 43. Justice Gorsuch denied this is where his logic would lead. See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382 
(plurality opinion) (suggesting that his logic applies only to a revocation that “requires a substantial 
increase in the minimum sentence to which a defendant may be exposed”). In the next paragraph, 
however, Justice Gorsuch asserted that the government cannot “send a free man back to prison for 
years based on judge-found facts.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2386. 
 47. Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N 2018)). Justice Breyer might have pointed out that if revocation sanctions were 
punishment for the revocation conduct, that conduct could not be separately pursued in a new 
prosecution without violating double jeopardy protections. The Court has clearly said such new 
prosecutions are permitted. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (“Where the acts 
of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would 
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were also punishment for the 
same offense. Treating postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense, however 
(as most courts have done), avoids these difficulties.”). 
 48. See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2384 (plurality opinion); id. at 2390 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 49. See id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215–16 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684, 704 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 52. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Although Justice Breyer’s opinion is short—even cryptic—it does 
succinctly capture why the Apprendi line of cases cannot apply broadly to all 
revocations of parole, probation, or supervised release.53 So, before moving on 
to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, I will pause here to explicate more than 
Justice Breyer does on how his understanding of Apprendi and Alleyne would 
play out in the situation of revocation rules that do not “closely resemble the 
punishment of [a] new criminal offense[].”54 
III.  DISENTANGLING APPRENDI’S RIGHTS 
If we understand revocation sanctions to be part of the punishment for the 
original crime—and, again, that is the long-held understanding as well as the 
understanding of all nine members of the Haymond Court—then the severity of 
revocation sanctions is constitutionally “limited by the severity of the original 
crime.”55 Here, Haymond’s child pornography conviction exposed him to a 
maximum term of ten years’ imprisonment and five years to life of supervised 
release.56 So the highest term of imprisonment Haymond could constitutionally 
receive on the revocation of his supervised release was the maximum provided 
in the statute of conviction: ten years minus the three years and two months to 
which he was originally sentenced.57 This comes out to six years and ten months. 
But wait—Haymond’s new sentence was only five years, which is less than 
what would be constitutionally permitted. Even after adding a new sentence to 
the original sentence, the total was less than the maximum authorized for the 
offense of conviction. Sure, the Walsh Act permitted the judge in his discretion 
to impose up to a life sentence.58 But the judge did not exercise that discretion. 
So why was Haymond’s final sentence of ninety-eight months unconstitutional, 
where the crime of conviction permitted up to 120 months? The answer seems 
to be that both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Breyer understood the factfinding 
that triggered the mandatory five-year minimum as retroactively increasing the 
minimum of the lawful sentencing range that Haymond faced, which Alleyne 
barred.59 
 
 53. Since Justice Breyer’s opinion resolved the case on the narrowest grounds, it supplies the 
holding per Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), which mandates that the only binding part of 
a fragmented Court decision is the “position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.” Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(plurality opinion)). But see Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1943 
(2019) (arguing that the Marks rule should be abandoned because it “shifts costly interpretive burdens 
to later courts, privileges outlier views among the Justices, and discourages desirable compromises”). 
 54. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2378 (plurality opinion). 
 57. See id. at 2373. 
 58. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 141(e)(2), 120 
Stat. 603 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)). 
 59. See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378 (plurality opinion); id. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Was the majority in Haymond right, at least as to a narrow understanding 
of its holding, that imposing a new mandatory term of imprisonment upon 
supervision revocation based on new judicial factfinding violates Alleyne? Justice 
Alito and the three Justices who joined him did not think so.60 Justice Alito did 
a fine job of highlighting the potentially far-reaching consequences of Justice 
Gorsuch’s dicta—which indicate that any factfinding that leads the judge to 
impose an additional deprivation of liberty upon supervision revocation is 
unconstitutional, whether or not it involves triggering a mandatory minimum 
or altering the maximum lawful sentence.61 
Justice Alito was both careful and convincing in his interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment: that it does not speak to supervision revocations at all.62 The 
question posed at the beginning of this Article—when does the “criminal 
prosecution” referenced in the Sixth Amendment end?—is actually more 
complicated than it may appear. That is because some Sixth Amendment rights 
are of longer duration than others. A supervision-violation proceeding certainly 
happens after a defendant’s “speedy trial” right has come to an end; the Court 
has made clear that the Speedy Trial Clause does not even apply to the 
sentencing proceeding.63 Moreover, as Justice Alito pointed out, the Sixth 
Amendment states that an “accused” enjoys the right to jury trial.64 But once a 
verdict or guilty plea is entered, a defendant is no longer accused of being guilty; 
they have been found guilty.65 
Likewise, it seems to me, the revocation hearing is clearly after the 
“criminal prosecution” has ended—even as other constitutional protections do 
apply. Take, for instance, the right to counsel. That right features prominently 
in the Sixth Amendment.66 But the conditional right to counsel at certain parole 
revocation hearings, recognized in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,67 was not the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.68 Scarpelli had a right to counsel because the 
Fourteenth Amendment demands due process of law.69 
I want to end by considering Haymond’s due process rights. We do well 
to remember that the Apprendi line of cases connects two different constitutional 
 
 60. Id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 2388. 
 62. Id. at 2394–95. 
 63. Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 1617–18 (2016). 
 64. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2398 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 65. See id. at 2395, 2398 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 67. 441 U.S. 778 (1973). 
 68. Id. at 790–91. 
 69. Id. Similarly, the right to counsel pointedly mentioned in the warnings resulting from 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is not found in the Sixth Amendment; rather, Miranda’s right 
to counsel is related to the accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
See id. at 469 (“[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . .”). 
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rights: the right to trial by jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
as recognized in In re Winship.70 It is time that we decouple these rights. They 
are different. The latter requirement, proof of every element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, is not a Sixth Amendment right.71 It is a due process right.72 
I do not mean the Sixth Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment; I mean the stand-alone Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
I submit that Haymond was a missed opportunity for the Court to 
disentangle the two Apprendi rights. Haymond’s revocation and new sentence 
did not violate or touch upon his right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution 
because the criminal prosecution was over. Still, it seems unjust that the district 
court was compelled by the Walsh Act to sentence Haymond to an additional 
five years in prison—at least—upon finding by a bare preponderance that, 
recently, Haymond knowingly possessed thirteen images of child pornography. 
Why is that not a violation of In re Winship? The adjudication in that case 
was, like Haymond’s revocation hearing, a proceeding at which there was no 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.73 I urge that we consider whether 
revocation proceedings are more like juvenile proceedings than they are like, 
say, bail hearings.74 
I urge you also to look again at Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.75 That 1986 dissent—about the legislative 
specification of a factor that, if found by the judge, required imposition of a 
mandatory minimum sentence76—was, in my view, the first in the Apprendi line. 
Justice Stevens explained that where the legislature finds a sentencing factor 
that raises the lawful minimum sentence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
 
 70. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000) (“As we 
made clear in Winship, the ‘reasonable doubt’ requirement ‘has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure 
for cogent reasons.’ . . . We thus require this, among other, procedural protections in order to ‘provid[e] 
concrete substance for the presumption of innocence . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Winship, 
397 U.S. at 363)). 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 72. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”). 
 73. See id. at 368; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial right does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
 74. Under the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.), if a court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant is a flight risk, it must order detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); United 
States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 75. 477 U.S. 79 (1986); id. at 95–104 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
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required.77 The opinion was about due process.78 Justice Stevens only 
mentioned the jury in footnotes and did not make a big deal about it.79 
Many of the decisions that came after Apprendi obscured the fact that the 
decision was as much about the constitutional guarantees of due process as it 
was about the right to trial by jury.80 Indeed, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
in Apprendi paid more attention to the due process right to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, established in In re Winship, than to the right to trial by jury 
established in the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.81 Justice Stevens realized that the Apprendi rule 
would not, in fact, result in significantly more jury trials, though it would 
strengthen a defendant’s hand in plea negotiations and agreements.82 At bottom 
for Justice Stevens, this line of cases was not about juries but about a fairer 
playing field where, most importantly, a defendant could not be whipsawed by 
pleading guilty to one crime only to be sentenced by the judge for a greater 
crime.83 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, had an almost obsessive fascination 
with the jury—famously asserting in Blakely v. Washington84 that the jury was 
the “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice.”85 
 
 77. Id. at 96. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 97 n.1, 99 n.3. 
 80. Compare Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298 (2004) (characterizing the issue before 
the Court as “whether [judicial determination of ‘deliberate cruelty’] violated petitioner’s Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220, 248 (2005) (referring to 
the merits-majority as imposing a “constitutional jury trial requirement”); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 
164 (2009) (stating that the “sole issue” before the Court “is whether the Sixth Amendment . . . 
precludes” judicial determination of whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive); id. at 168 
(stating that Apprendi’s “animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark 
between the State and the accused”); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 829 (2010) (citing Apprendi 
and asserting that “Dillon’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated” by the trial judge’s exercise of 
sentencing discretion within the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines range); S. Union Co. v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 343, 349 (2012) (stating that “Apprendi’s ‘core concern’ is to reserve to the jury 
‘the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense’”); Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) (stating that under Apprendi, “a judge cannot go beyond identifying 
the crime of conviction to explore the manner in which the defendant committed that offense”); and 
Pereida v. Wilkinson, No. 19-438, 2021 WL 816351, at *9 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2021) (concluding that because 
“Sixth Amendment concerns are not present in the immigration context,” noncitizens may bear the 
burden of proof when seeking to cancel their removal order), with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 
99, 104 (2013) (noting that both the right under the Sixth Amendment to a trial “by an impartial jury” 
and the right under the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 81. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000). Justice Stevens’s Apprendi opinion 
described the right to trial by jury as the “associated jury protections” to a core due process right. Id. 
 82. See Booker, 543 U.S. 273–74, 285, 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 288–89. 
 84. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 85. Id. at 306; see also Haymond v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2019) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Justice Gorsuch’s even greater preoccupation with juries is unfortunate. 
For all nine members of the Court, Haymond was about the limits on the right 
to trial by jury. This is too bad, considering that, in the United States, we do 
not often have jury trials.86 But we do have many final proceedings, beyond the 
occasional criminal trial, in which the government seeks to prove a fact that will 
require or authorize a significant infringement on a person’s liberty.87 In these 
situations, to which the Sixth Amendment does not apply, we need to honestly 
face the question of whether due process of law requires the government to 
prove its allegations to a heightened standard of proof—perhaps even beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
In Haymond’s wake, I find it doubtful that the Sixth Amendment is the 
right vehicle for delivering procedural protections after sentencing, or even at 
sentencing in the overwhelming number of cases, where defendants have 
explicitly waived their right to trial by jury (indeed, trial itself). Due process, 
on the other hand, still applies with full force. 
Perhaps that is looking too far ahead. For now, it is at least fair to say that 
the plurality decision in Haymond appends to its narrow holding about a 
recondite portion of the supervised release statute a great deal of dicta that 
enunciates a far-reaching, though not fully fleshed-out, vision of the 
postconviction applicability of Apprendi, Alleyne, and the Sixth Amendment. 
Justice Gorsuch’s Haymond opinion lays down the beginnings of an ambitious 
effort to extend the Apprendi line well beyond its present confines. 
Whether he will accomplish this remains to be seen. Some of the Justices 
who joined the plurality opinion might balk at a challenge to other provisions 
of the supervised release statute (which have state counterparts), even where 
challengers put forward similar arguments to those that the Haymond plurality 
articulated.88 
 
 86. For instance, from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2020, the federal courts disposed of cases involving 
79,997 defendants. Of those, only 1,365 (1.7%) were convicted or acquitted at a jury trial. See U.S. 
CTS., STAT. & REPORTS, Table D-4: U.S. District Courts–Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of 
Disposition and Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020 (2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2020/06/30 [https:// 
perma.cc/D3C8-TDWH]. Similarly, jury and bench trials constitute less than three percent of criminal 
case dispositions in nearly every state. John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to 
Trial, and Most Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-
and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/Q5F7-XBCH]. 
 87. These include, among others, civil commitment and deportation proceedings, both of which 
require proof only by clear and convincing evidence. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 
(1979) (civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (deportation). 
 88. So far, the federal circuit courts have rebuffed such arguments, though some have implicitly 
conceded that the plurality’s logic implicates portions of the supervised release statute other than 
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On the occasion of Apprendi’s twentieth anniversary, Haymond gives us a 
glimpse into Apprendi’s future—and prompts us to consider whether either case 




§ 3583(k). See, e.g., United States v. Doka, 955 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Haymond did not 
undermine our clear precedent on the constitutionality of § 3583(e)(3).”); United States v. Seighman, 
966 F.3d 237, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2020) (declining to extend Haymond to § 3583(g)); United States v. 
Garner, 969 F.3d 550, 552–53 (5th Cir. 2020) (same); United States v. Eagle Chasing, 965 F.3d 647, 
651 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Until the Supreme Court invalidates § 3583(e)(3), we must follow our precedent 
and hold that the revocation of [the defendant’s] release did not violate his constitutional rights.”). 
State courts have rejected similar challenges to their probation systems based on Haymond. See, e.g., 
People v. Schaffer, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 666, 670–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (analyzing Haymond at length 
and concluding that it did not affect the constitutionality of a 180-day jail sentence imposed on the 
defendant for his parole violation of failing to keep his GPS device charged); State v. Dunlap, 225 
A.3d 1068, 1079–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020) (“[W]e read the Haymond plurality and 
dissenting opinions to be consistent with our conclusion that Apprendi, Blakely, Alleyne, and Ring focus 
exclusively on prison sentences and simply do not apply to non-custodial probationary sentences.”). 
